On Friday, August 5, in the middle of the afternoon, the Israeli army attacked the Gaza Strip, targeting a building in a residential neighborhood, right in the city center. The strikes, followed by further salvos a few hours later and bombardments during the night, killed Tayseer Al-Jabari – commander of the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the movement that controls the Palestinian enclave along with Hamas.
On Sunday, August 7, shortly after 11:30pm, Israel and Islamic Jihad laid down their weapons after mediation by Egypt. It's a precarious ceasefire, for which the Islamist movement said it had obtained an "Egyptian commitment to work for the release of two prisoners" – Khalil Awawdeh, detained without charge and in failing health after nearly 150 days on hunger strike, and Bassam Al-Saadi, head of Islamic Jihad in the occupied West Bank.
Political scientist Leïla Seurat, a researcher at the Centre Arabe de Recherches et d’Etudes Politiques (the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies) and associate at the Centre de Recherches Sociologiques sur le Droit et les Institutions Pénales (Center for Sociological Research on Law and Penal Institutions), looks at the origins of this movement and its relationship with Hamas, both its competitor and ally.
For what purpose was Palestinian Islamic Jihad founded?
Islamic Jihad was founded in the late 1970s by Fathi Shiqaqi, a Palestinian who was initially close to the Muslim Brotherhood organization but who gradually distanced himself from it by criticizing its lack of commitment to the national liberation struggle. He also criticized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for its secularist approach. The PIJ, conceived from the outset as a third way, was founded in opposition to these two movements.
At its core, Islamic Jihad is made up of former members of the Muslim Brotherhood and a Fatah group [the party of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas]. It advocates the establishment of a Palestinian Islam that is both patriotic and revolutionary.
More broadly, its political offer is in line with the regional climate which discredits Baathism and pan-Arabism [which aim to unify the Arab peoples], exacerbated by the Syrian intervention against the PLO in Lebanon in 1976. Another factor is the emergence at that time of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which fueled Fathi Shiqaqi's anti-colonial theses and reinforced his idea of developing another option to liberate the territories conquered by Israel.
The ideological hybridity of the movement, which is both Sunni and strongly inspired by Shiism, led it to distance itself from both Fatah and Hamas, promoting its neutrality and working as much as possible for the unification of the Palestinian ranks.
What is the relationship between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas?
As early as 2006, Islamic Jihad criticized Hamas for its participation in the Palestinian legislative elections and in Palestinian Authority institutions. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad has no desire to exercise political power. In 2007, Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip led it to seek to consolidate its truce with Israel. This situation gave it greater control over other factions that wanted to confront Israel militarily, with Islamic Jihad at the forefront.
Depending on the context, Hamas has more or less imposed this control, often letting Islamic Jihad operate, or even allying itself with it. This was the case in August 2011 when several rockets were fired at towns in southern Israel by the Al-Quds Brigades [the armed wing of the PIJ] and by the Al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas. The two military organizations issued a joint statement to announce the bombing of the Ofakim settlement, in response to the assassination of a leader of the Popular Resistance Committees.
Islamic Jihad, however, can be a problem for Hamas, simply because it threatens its prestige. This competition was particularly evident during the Israeli aggression of November 2012. Islamic Jihad first sent a rocket with a range of 70 kilometers towards Tel Aviv, which was immediately followed by another shot from Hamas' Al-Qassam Brigades.
But this competition does not prevent co-ordination between the two movements, which more often than not show their solidarity when signing truces affirming the victory of all resistance factions. Furthermore, since 2018, all armed factions have been represented in a joint chamber of military operations.
What about the relationship between PIJ and the Palestinian Authority?
Islamic Jihad does not recognize the Palestinian Authority institutions that have entered into security co-ordination with Israel. Instead, it seeks, like Hamas, to join the PLO and reactivate that structure on a new basis.
What is Israel's strategy towards these two movements?
Israel has long held Hamas responsible for rockets fired by other factions from the Gaza Strip, regularly targeting Al-Qassam Brigades fighters in response to actions by others, including Islamic Jihad.
Israel regularly exploits the relationship between these two movements by assassinating the leaders of Islamic Jihad (in 2011 and in 2019) to test the reaction of Hamas. Hamas, although committed to the truce, is more often than not obliged to let Islamic Jihad respond to the assassinations of its leaders.
The latest Israeli aggression seems to show a notable evolution: Israel does not seem to consider Hamas responsible for the 500 rockets fired during the three days of the confrontation. At no time did Israel target Hamas. This relative tolerance seems to be part of a renewed strategy of dividing the ranks of the resistance after the battle called "the Sword of Jerusalem." In 2021, the emergence of a common front by all Palestinian factions in this battle was a real blow to Israel.
By officially naming Islamic Jihad as the main enemy and asking Hamas to choose between the Islamic Jihad "terrorists" and the civilian population in Gaza, Israel is attempting to undermine the common front that emerged in this battle. It is too early to tell how effective this divisive strategy will prove to be.
The fact remains that this latest Israeli aggression has, once again, put Hamas in a difficult position. Hamas, which is committed to holding a truce, has seen its legitimacy as a resistance movement somewhat tarnished.
Is Palestinian Islamic Jihad supported by the Gazan population?
The movement enjoys a very high level of popularity among the Palestinian population, not only in Gaza – not being in power, PIJ has not suffered from the depreciation of its image, as Hamas has – but also in the West Bank.
Does Palestinian Islamic Jihad have allies in the region?
Islamic Jihad receives significant economic and military assistance from Iran. Unlike Hamas, it did not close its offices in Damascus following the Syrian uprising in 2011. Nor did it criticize Hezbollah for its involvement in the fighting in Syria. For all that, Islamic Jihad cannot be considered a "proxy" for Iran. In recent years, it has shown its independence from Tehran on several issues.
This is the case, for example, with the war in Yemen: while the Iranians had urged Islamic Jihad to align itself with their position, its leaders refused – which would have cost them a reduction in economic support from the Islamic Republic. Islamic Jihad is keen to show its autonomy and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Also, while ideologically close to Iran, Islamic Jihad emphasizes the Sunni nature of its organization. While some sources mention conversions to Shiism by its members, its leaders regularly take care to clarify matters: a Shiite cannot officially be part of the organization, which remains Sunni, even if bridges are possible.