Putin still thinks he can achieve additional gains in Ukraine

Among the notable speakers at the 10th Delphi Economic Forum (April 9-12) was retired general David Petraeus. With a stern gaze, sharp articulation, and an imposing presence, the former CIA director and chairman of private equity firm KKR Middle East participated as a speaker in the panel titled “Europe under Attack: Russia’s Hybrid Activities and the Continent’s Muted Response.”

Kathimerini conducted an exclusive interview with Petraeus, with the military veteran asking that the discussion focus on the war in Ukraine – an issue that, it seems, is of deep concern to him. In his recent book, “Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine,” co-authored with Andrew Roberts, General Petraeus analyzes the evolution of warfare from World War II to today’s conflicts, with a particular focus on the tactics employed in Ukraine and Gaza. In fact, one sentence stands out as capturing the philosophical dimension of his military thinking: “War seems to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.”

The US seems to be in the process of negotiating with Russia. In your view, are we at the end of the war or have we entered a new phase of the war?
I would hope that we would be on the threshold of a ceasefire, but I am not even certain about that. It does not seem that President Putin is really serious about negotiating a complete ceasefire and is employing a number of delaying tactics, obfuscating issues, stretching all these discussions as long as he can because he does not seem to be convinced yet that he cannot achieve additional incremental gains, albeit at extraordinary cost. And so he is continuing the war. On the other hand, I hope that President Trump and European leaders can come together and present a front to Russia that would convince President Putin that he cannot achieve additional gains at an acceptable cost. But I do not think we are quite at that point yet.

Does the new US administration really understand what is at stake in Ukraine?
I think President Trump is very cognizant of the terrible bloodshed, the loss, the damage, and destruction. He is right to observe that this is the worst carnage since World War II in Europe and he wants to see an end to it, as we all do, but we want to see it end in a way that is lasting and does not allow Russia to just arm and retrain for two years and launch another invasion of Ukraine. So there absolutely has to be an ironclad security guarantee, which is part of the negotiation of the ceasefire, and the search for that guarantee is still ongoing.

What specific military objectives must Ukraine achieve to secure better negotiating conditions?
I have long said that the best way to achieve a ceasefire would be to enable Ukraine to change the dynamics on the battlefield. In other words, to show President Putin that he cannot achieve additional gains at an acceptable cost, that the cost will be so high that even he will not continue the war. And of course, this would be reinforced if the United States, Europe, and other peace-loving countries around the world imposed additional crippling sanctions on the Russian economy, energy exports, and so on. This would be hugely complementary to what Ukraine would be able to do if armed much more fully on the battlefield.

Given the current circumstances, how do you define “victory” for Ukraine or, better, a “rational solution”?
Well, that is a very debatable topic. There are certainly those who define victory for Ukraine as regaining all of the territory it has lost, at least since 2022, if not since 2014, when Crimea and Donbas were seized by Russia. However, I think that as an interim objective, it is to stop the additional aggression by Russia, meaning the additional night operations to conduct further damage and destruction to Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and so on. That should be the goal. And then to ensure that this is again enduring, durable, and that there will be conditions established that ensure that Russia does not contemplate another invasion of Ukraine.

Even if it loses territory?
I would like to see Ukraine regain all this territory. I do not think they should ever be forced to recognize the Russian seizure of that territory and its occupation, but instead, as an interim measure to achieve a ceasefire. The key, once again, is to have an ironclad security guarantee so that Russia recognizes up-front the extraordinary penalties it will face if it violates the ceasefire.

Going deeper into the military dimension of the war, on August 6, 2024, Ukraine invaded and occupied part of Kursk, forcing Russian forces to turn to the internal border. However, the Ukrainian advance collapsed in seven months. What kind of battle strategy is Russia using today? 
Ukraine’s strategy was to force Russia to defend its own territory, to divert its forces towards it instead of sending them to the southeastern part of the country, let’s say Donetsk and Luhansk, where they would continue their attacks instead of eventually diverting them, as they did, to Kursk. Historians over time can debate these various operations, but this was really a very substantial achievement at the time by Ukraine. In fact, the Ukrainians managed to surprise and were able to assemble many brigades, and not only armor and infantry, but also artillery, drone support, engineers, electronic warfare, command, control, communications, and all the necessary logistics that finally allowed for such a deep invasion of Russian territory. Speaking of today, Russia has thrown huge forces, including over 10,000 North Korean forces, into operations to expel Ukraine from Russian territory. Ukraine still holds a small part of Kursk, but apparently has been forced to withdraw under the pressure of these many tens of thousands of Russian and North Korean forces.

How important is the use of drones and unmanned vehicles in modern battlefields?
Unmanned systems have become extraordinarily important in this battlefield. Both sides are using them, and the technological advances are greater on the Ukrainian side, and unmanned systems are even more important for Ukraine than for Russia, given how much they are outnumbered on the front line by Russian forces, which are often several times larger. The use of drones has enabled Ukraine to avoid large Russian raids. Last year alone, they produced 1.5 million drones, hundreds of which are used at night to penetrate Russian territory and go after their headquarters, Russian refineries, fuel storage depots, airfields, and critical air force elements. And then thousands of drones are dropped by the Ukrainians on Russian forces every day, and it is the deadliest “no-man’s-land” ever in history. Another advantage of using drones is that they allowed a country with no real navy to sink a third of the Russian Black Sea fleet and force it out of the western Black Sea, opening up the opportunity for Ukraine to export grain by ship rather than by land. It is worth mentioning that Ukraine carried out the first drone attack using ground-based robotic systems, remote-controlled machine guns, and with the support of hundreds of unmanned airborne systems. Therefore, the Ukrainians are at the bleeding edge of unmanned systems technology. Plus, they are incorporating artificial intelligence into them and producing much better drones at a much lower price than we in the US can. This is a huge achievement by the Ukrainians, and without this achievement, they would not have achieved nearly as impressive results on the battlefield.

Europe seems unprepared for a multifront war. Strategically speaking, how can we reverse that atmosphere and enhance our defense capabilities?
Europe has taken impressive steps in just a couple of months as a result of a very significant prodding from President Donald Trump. Germany has taken steps, even before the new government actually takes office, that will allow it to be able to spend hundreds of billions of euros on defense. Also, the EU is collectively making an effort, and individual countries have also increased their defense spending, and it is a record number of NATO members now spending 2% or more of their GDP on defense, and this will continue. It will clearly take years to achieve what they need to do, but it is an extremely encouraging development in Europe that was long overdue.

Concluding, what are the key components of modern military doctrine adapted to technological changes?
I think that doctrine, even in the US, needs to embrace much more rapidly what is happening in Ukraine. And this is particularly with respect to unmanned systems, again, not just aerial unmanned systems of all types of long-range and “suicide” surveillance, but also unmanned maritime and ground systems. As we see now, the US is involved in this adaptation, but we need to speed up the procurement system very significantly in order to take advantage of what we are learning from the battlefield in Ukraine.