Speech by Minister For Foreign Affairs at the Folk och Försvar Annual National Conference

SWEDEN, January 12 - Your Majesty,

Your Royal Highnesses,

Ladies and gentlemen,

There is no question what the core task of Swedish foreign and security policy is. It centres on constraining Russia, especially by supporting Ukraine.

For this reason, I would like to devote this time to speaking about how Sweden, together with its Allies, is actively constraining Russia’s capacity to inflict harm on us. 

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We – NATO, the EU and Sweden – are facing a profound conflict and confrontation with Russia. We did not want, choose or cause this – the Russian leadership did. 

Russia sees the war against Ukraine as a war against the West over Ukraine. But Russia’s war aims go further than this.

Russia wants to force a new division of Europe.

States on Europe’s eastern flank – including Sweden – are to be made difficult to defend and susceptible to Russian pressure and threats.

Today it’s Tbilisi, Chisinau and Kyiv. Tomorrow it could be the capitals by the Baltic Sea.

Russia’s economy and society have been conditioned for a long, drawn-out conflict with the West.

The propaganda on which this conditioning is based has been disseminated for many years, and its intensity is now being ratcheted up.

The Kremlin is rational, based on its own logic, but ruthless and prepared to use any means deemed beneficial to Russia. 

It is to a large extent down to us how far Russia can go. It depends on how resolutely and strongly we, the defenders of democracy and the European order, stand together. 

To weather the storm, the cargo must be secured. 

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Sweden will respond to the threat from Russia with a robust and active policy of constraint that must be able to endure for a generation or more. 

Its guiding principles are simple and clear. 

Firstly: we must preserve our security against Russia from a position of strength. Militarily, economically and politically. 

Investing in our strengths means that we are reinforcing our defence and security cooperation within NATO, the EU and northern Europe. An Article 5 with political and military credibility – a strong deterrence – is our most important means to maintain stability and security. Sweden’s membership of NATO is key, and Sweden has become stronger because of it.

Secondly: we must actively constrain Russia’s capability to expand its power to do us harm. We must reduce the Kremlin’s scope for action. 

Sweden’s strong support to Ukraine and key contribution to NATO’s deterrence across northern Europe restricts Russia’s scope for military action. Our contribution to sanctions and deterrence stifles the country’s economic resource base. This includes measures against countries that enable Russia’s aggression in different ways: China, North Korea, Iran and Belarus. 

Thirdly: we must strengthen resilience throughout society to both so-called hybrid threats and armed attack. We’re raising the threshold and we’re raising the costs for antagonists looking for weaknesses on a broad front. 

Fourthly: our policy of constraint is only effective as long as it is pursued together with our Allies, our partners and our neighbours. 

With credibility, ideas and a clear view of our interests, Sweden is involved in shaping Russia policy in NATO and the EU. In the areas that I have touched on, Sweden is one of the countries taking the lead. We do what we say, and we say what we do.

Our active policy of constraint is being pursued right now, and on a broad front. It is also long-term and systematic. We assume that Russia’s aggressive intentions will not change. 

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I would like to comment in particular on two aspects of our policy of constraint that are current right now: so-called hybrid operations and the Russian shadow fleet.

I say so-called hybrid operations because I take issue with the term hybrid. It’s misleading and ambiguous, and it obscures the substance and gravity of its meaning. I think many people associate the word with environmentally friendly cars rather than with the potentially deadly threats it actually implies.

In reality, it’s about hostile acts, aimed at imposing Russia’s will on us – NATO, the EU and Sweden. 

It’s about letter bombs that could have exploded on aircraft. Arson and attempted murder. Energy wars. Exploitation of migrants and migrant flows. Electoral manipulation. Thinly veiled nuclear threats.

It is no coincidence that the majority of attacks target states on the frontline, such as our Baltic neighbours, Finland and Poland. These countries are portrayed as being equally responsible for the confrontation, in an attempt to weaken other Allies’ solidarity with them. 

Likewise, it is no coincidence that the primary target of Russian disinformation in Europe is Germany. The aim is to influence the most politically and economically influential state in Europe, without whose involvement a strong European Russia policy is practically impossible.

What is happening is thus an attack both on the West’s support to Ukraine and on NATO’s defence capabilities. The aim is for us to abandon our support to Ukraine. For us to believe that the costs and risks are too high. 

And by weakening NATO and the EU politically, the aim is to create scope for military action for Russia. 

Sweden sees what Russia is doing. We understand the goal. And along with our Allies, we are addressing these hostile acts with determination and clarity and based on international law. 

We are constantly developing our situational awareness and our response measures. NATO’s ongoing and enhanced activities in the Baltic Sea region demonstrate the strength of the Alliance.

We know that as long as we stick together and stand strong in our support to Ukraine and behind NATO’s deterrence and defence, Russia will continue to fail in its aims.

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Russia’s weakness is its war economy. The Kremlin is employing widespread deception to attempt to paint a picture of stability. But this is an illusion – a Potemkin village. The sanctions are working.

Inflation is claimed to be at nine per cent, but is at least double that figure. That is a direct result of the war economy. The Kremlin has mortgaged Russia’s economic future. 

The Russian economy stands or falls on the price of oil. Oil is bankrolling the war. 

This is also where the shadow fleet comes in, as a tool of the Russian war economy. Due to the nature of the shadow fleet – which often consists of old vessels approved by less scrupulous flag states, and crews with no experience of the Baltic Sea – it also poses a security and environmental risk to Sweden and the other coastal states.

Now we must do two things.

First and foremost: lower the oil price cap, that is, the price at which Russia is permitted to sell oil. 

The lower the price of Russian oil, the faster there will be peace.

Today, I can announce that together with my Nordic and Baltic colleagues in the EU, I have written a letter to urge the European Commission to propose lowering the oil price cap within G7 coordination. 

Secondly: we are now stepping up our systematic efforts to stop the shadow fleet, which Russia is using to circumvent the oil price cap.

No EU country is doing more than Sweden to identify vessels and key actors in the shadow fleet so that they can be placed on the sanctions list. And we see that the sanctions are having an effect.

A reduced oil price cap and enhanced measures to curtail the shadow fleet go hand in hand. 

Together, they reduce Russia’s scope to harm us. This is how Sweden is pursuing an active policy of constraint, on a broad front. 

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I began by observing that there is no question about the focal point of Sweden’s foreign policy: it is about constraining Russia, primarily by supporting Ukraine. This is an investment in our security.

It doesn’t mean merely ploughing the same furrows we have always ploughed.

On the contrary. We have demonstrated that we as a country are capable of adapting. 

Since last year’s Annual National Conference, we have joined NATO. We have increased our support to Ukraine. We have continued to increase defence spending. We have strengthened our regional security cooperation.

We will need to continue to think innovatively and meet new challenges.

But for the foreseeable future, our security must be built against Russia.  We must defend our peace and freedom from a position of strength, and we must do so together with our partners and Allies. 

Together, we have the strength to defend ourselves and prevent Europe being divided again. Thank you.